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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. S. HATCH CO., a Utali corpora-
tion, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING, STEW ART 
M. HANSON, ITS COMMISSION-
ERS; THE DENVER AND RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
CO., a Delaware corporation; THE 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM~­
p ANY, a Utah corporation; and GUY 
PRICHARD, dba Guy Prichard 
Transfer, 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Case No. 8182 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Supreme Court on a Writ 
of Review for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings, 
findings and report and order of the Public Service Com-
mission of etah in the above captioned matter. Petition 
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2 
for rehearing was filed by petitioner with the Public 
Service Commission on March 5, 1954. On l\Iarch 12, 1954, 
the Public Service Commission issued its orde,r denying 
said petition for rehearing and on April 9, 1954, peti-
tioner filed its petition for a Writ of Review with the 
Supreme Court, and on April 9, 1954, said "\Vrit was is-
sued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
W. S. Hatch Co., petitioner herein, is a corporation 
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State 
of Utah. On August 19, 1953, petitioner filed its applica-
tion with the Public Service Commission of Utah for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing peti-
tioner to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle 
for the transportation of acid (including used and con-
taminated acids) in bulk, in tank vehicles over irregular 
routes from and to all points and places within tlie State 
of Utah not then served by applicant under its existing 
authority. At the time said application was filed appli-
cant held authority to transport acid as a common carrier, 
in bulk, in tank vehicles for hire over irregular routes 
between Woods Cross, Utah, on the one hand and all 
points and places within Salt Lake County on the other 
as well as to, fr01n and between all points and places in 
Salt Lake County and four-tenths (.4) of one mile be-
yond the limits of Salt Lake County and into Tooele 
County as well as to, from and between all points and 
places within Salt Lake County. (R. 13) 
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After due notice, hearing on said application was 
had on December 1 and December 2, 1953, before the 
Public Service Commission at its offices in Salt Lake 
City. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 
the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and Guy Prichard, 
djbja Guy Prichard Transfer, hereinafter referred to as 
Prichard, appeared at the hearing protesting petitioner's 
application. 
Petitioner challenged the right of protestant Prich-
ard to appear in this case (R. 106) on the grounds that 
Prichard's authority did not cover the transportation 
of acid and for that reason he had no right to participate 
in the hearing. After some argument the Commission 
ruled that Prichard had sufficient interest to participate 
in the hearing, but reserved the ruling on the question of 
the construction of his authority to determine whether 
or not it included the transportation of acid. 
Commissioner Hacking made the following statement 
as to the necessity of construing Prichard's rights in 
order to determine the issues in the instant application 
(R. 111). 
"COM. HACKING: Of course, in testing the 
need for the services proposed by the Applicant 
in this case, I suppose the fact as to whether or 
not Pritchard offers a service in a part of the ter-
ritory covered by the application would be very 
material to the consideration of the whole ques-
tion." 
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The evidence shows that petitioner rnaintains a large 
number of tractors, trucks and tank truck equipment, 
the detail of which is reflected on petitioner's equipment 
list (Ex. 1, R. 12). The equ~pment owned and operated by 
petitioner for the transportation of acid in bulk consists 
of three semi-trailers, one full four-wheel trailer a tank 
' truck and various trucks and tractors for use in connec-
tion therewith (R. 12, 87). 
Mr. Carl 0. McFarland testified in behalf of the 
Solar Corporation in Ogden, Utah, that his company 
manufactures storage batteries and uses 200-250 tons of 
sulphuric acid per year (R.165). He testified further that 
storage facilities maintained by his con1pany for acid 
were such that it became necessary to deplete their in-
ventory to a dangerously low point before they had capa-
city to take a full railroad carload (R. 166). Railroad 
tank cars have a capacity of approximately 6,000, 8,000 or 
10,000 gallons, which amounts to a minimum of twice the 
capacity of a tank truck andjor trailer load (R .. 88). 
He also testified that rail service is slow and that de-
livery by raiload necessitated the n1aintenance of a larger 
inventory than would be the case if his company had truck 
service available to supplement rail service (R. 167, 169). 
He further testified that the combination of truck and rail 
service would afford his company an opportunity for im-
proving safety, inventory economics and savings on 
pumping expense. The Commission n1ade a finding in 
accordance with the testimony outlined above (R. 24) and 
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based on such finding the Commission granted petitioner 
authority to transport acid between Salt Lake County 
and Weber County (R. 27). Of this finding and order 
petitioner makes no complaint. 
Mr. Harold Ellison, the production manager for 
Layton Sugar Company, whose plant is located in Layton, 
Davis County, Utah, gave similar testimony regarding 
the need for truck service for the transportation of acid 
to the Layton Sugar Company plant. The Commission 
likewise found that public convenience and necessity re-
quired the services of petitioner for the transportation 
of acid from Salt Lake County to all points and places 
in Davis County (R. 24, 27). Of this finding and order 
petitioner makes no complaint. 
Testimony was given by witness John A. Riddle, the 
assistant director of the Processing Division of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, Grand Junction, Colorado, 
to the effect that sulphuric acid was used in treating 
uranium ore by what is known as the carbonate or soda 
ash leeching process (R. 212); and that as a result of the 
tremendous increase in the exploration, mining and pro-
duction of uranium ore throughout the Colorado Plateau, 
which extends to the Henry Mountains in Garfield and 
vV ayne Counties, as well as in the Marysvale area in 
Puite County (R. 210) and in the Southeastern part 
of the State and the Big Indian area in San Juan 
and Grand Counties (R. 215), the consumption of 
sulphuric acid in the southeastern part of the State of 
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Utah would increase from approximately three to five 
tons per day, or an average of four tons per day (R. 212) 
to approximately 25 to 50 tons per day at the Monticello 
Processing Plant (R. 213). A tank truck trailer can 
transport approximately 22 tons of acid in one load (R. 
88). Thus the increased production at the :Monticello 
plant would necessitate approximately two loads per day 
compared to the present use of acid requiring approxi-
Ina tely one load per week, or a consumption at Monti-
cello alone of approximately 14 times the present use. 
Mr. Riddle also testified that it will be necessary in the 
very near future to construct a new processing mill to 
process uranium ores now being mined in the Big Indian 
area in San Juan and Grand Counties, and that if such a 
mill is not built by private concerns the Atomic Energy 
Commission will build it (R. 216-217). He further testi-
fied that the acid consumption at such mill would amount 
to 100 to 150 tons of acid per day, or five to seven truck 
loads per day (R. 218). Furthermore, this witness testi-
fied that the consumption would be sporadic, thus requir-
ing even greater demands for transportation at times 
of peak consun1ption. It is undisputed that there is no rail 
service to Monticello or to San Juan County or beyond 
Thompson, in Grand County. The only source for new or 
unused acid in the State of Utah and to which the outlined 
testimony refers is the Garfield Chemical Company lo-
cated at Garfield, Salt Lake County (R. 94). The small 
amount of acid presently being used at the Monticello 
plant is now being transported by rail from Garfield to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Thompson and transported by truck from Thompson to 
.Monticello. There are various sources throughout the 
state for used or spent acid (R. 169-171). 
Mr. John W. Blackburn, the purchasing agent and 
mines auditor of the Vanadium Mines Corporation of 
America, testified on behalf of that company as to the 
present and contemplated consumption of acid at the, 
processing mill located at White Canyon or Hite, in San 
Juan County. He stated that his company was planning 
to expand the operation of such processing mill from 
approximately 79 tons of acid to approximately 400 tons 
of acid per month (R. 237). The acid presently used at 
the White Canyon Mill is being transported by Vanadium 
Corporation of America in its own equipment. Mr. Black-
burn stated that his company desired the services of a 
common carrier (R. 237) and would use the services of 
the petitioner herein if authority for such transportation 
was granted (R. 238). He further stated that Prichard 
had delivered one load of acid for his company, and that 
he was informed that Prichard refused to make further 
deliveries and for that reason he was not using Prichard's 
service at the present time (R. 232-236). 
Paul Blanchard of Salt Lake City, who is employed 
by the Utah Power & Light Co. as a steam production 
engineer, testified that his company will require approxi-
mately 2,500 pounds of acid per day at the steam-electric 
generating plant now being constructed at Castle Gate, 
Utah (R. 153). Mr. Blanchard testified that availability 
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of both rail and truck service was necessary because of 
limited storage facilities and unusual problems in con-
nection with the te-rrain in Price Canyon where the plant 
will be located (R. 153, 154). The Commission made a 
finding that public convenience and necessity required 
truck transportation of acid to Carbon County (R. 23). 
It further found that public convenience and necessity 
required additional truck transportation to the south-
eastern part of the State (R. 25). Notwithstanding such 
findings, the Commission denied petitioner's application 
as it related to these areas. The Commission's report 
and order was issued on February 23, 1954, granting peti-
tioner authority to transport acid from Salt Lake County 
to points and places in Davis and Weber Counties, and 
in all other respects it denied petitioner's application. 
STATEl\1ENT OF' POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE 
RIGHTS OF GUY PRICHARD TRANSFER TO INCLUDE AU-
THORITY TO TRANSPORT ACID IN BULK IN TANK 
TRUCKS. 
POINT II. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING PETITION-
ER'S APPLICATION AS TO ALL POINTS AND PLACES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH EXCEPT DAVIS AND WEBER 
COUNTIES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE 
RIGHTS OF GUY PRICHARD TRANSFER TO INCLUDE AU-
THORITY TO TRANSPORT ACID IN BULK IN TANK 
TRUCKS. 
The report and order issued by the Commission con-
tains the following language (R. 25-26): 
"Guy Prichard Transfer has for many years 
transported acid, in bulk, from the railhead at or 
near Thompsons, Utah, to the plant at Monticello, 
Utah, and has storage facilities on the railroad 
trackage and special tank truck equipment suitable 
for this operation. Prichard formerly transported 
bulk acid on a contract carrier permit. Upon the 
issuance of the certificate of convenience and 
necessity which Prichard now holds, the contract 
carrier permit issued to Prichard was cancelled 
under the theory that the transportation of acid 
in bulk would fall within the commodity descrip-
tion contained in the certificate of convenience and 
necessity issued Prichard. In determining the 
issues in this matter we find that Prichard has au-
thority to transport acid, in bulk, in tank trucks, 
specially designed and equipped for that purpose. 
The acid tank trailer operated by Prichard is now 
being used only part-time for the transportation 
of acid from Thompsons to Monticello, Utah, and 
is otherwise idle. In addition to the acid hauling 
equipment which Prichard now owns and operates, 
he has other equipment which might be used in 
connection with acid tank trailers." 
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The following footnote is contained on page 5 of the 
Commission's report and order (R. 26): 
Footnote 1: "The question as to whether 
the transportation of acid, in bulk, is included in 
the authority issued to Prichard by certificate of 
convenience and necessity No. 7 41 was made an 
issue in this case. Since there may be some ques-
tion as to the language of said certificate in this 
regard and since Prichard has been transporting 
acid in bulk since 1946 under the assumption that 
his authority covered such transportation, it may 
be necessary for the Commission in a separate 
order to specifically include in the certificate of 
convenience and necessity No. 741 authority to 
transport acid, in bulk, in special tank truck equip-
ment." 
The pertinent parts of the authority under which 
Prichard operates, i.e., certificate of convenience and 
necessity No. 741, are as follows (R. 20): 
"To operate as a com1non motor carrier hy 
motor vehicle for the transportation of: 
1. Commodities which by reason of their size, 
shape, weight, origin, or destination require equip-
ment of (or) service of a character not regularly 
furnished by regular common carriers at the regu-
lar line rates which commodities shall be such as, 
' . but shall not be limited to the following: Gasoline 
tanks, Boilers, Pipes, and Tubing to be used in 
connection therewith; Cable, Bridge, or Structural 
Iron or Steel; Concrete l\Iixers, Culverts, Explo-
sives, Grading and Road Equipment, Harvestors 
and Threshers; Locomotives, Machinery and 
Drag-line outfits; Piling, Pipe, Pole Line Con-
struction Material; Telephone or Telegraph Poles; 
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Rails, S1nokestacks; and Heavy Timbers; Machin-
ery, Materials, Supplies and equipment incidental 
to or used in, the construction, development, op-
er~tion and maintenance of facilities for the dis-
covery,' development, and production of natural 
gas and petroleum or minerals. 
2. Commodities in connection with the trans-
porting of which is rendered a special service in 
preparing such commodities for shipment or set-
ting up after delivery or otherwise rendering a 
needed service not a part of the ordinary act of 
transporting and not now regularly furnished by 
other regular common carriers for the regular 
line rates. 
3. Campsite equipment, camp supplies, fix-
tures and accessories which shall be transported 
to camps or to construction sites or locations. 
4. All parts, supplies, equipment and appur-
tenances necessarily connected or to be connected 
or used with any of the articles described in para-
graphs one and two, whenever such parts, sup-
plies, equipment and appurtenances are a part of 
the same movement. 
To perform the services defined between 
points in Utah where the origin or destination of 
the movement is in Uintah, Duchesne, Carbon, 
Emery, Wayne, Grand, or San Juan Counties, 
on call, over irregular routes." 
The Commission apparently recognizes the fact that 
to construe the above quoted language to include trans-
portation of acid, in bulk, does violence to the English 
language, and thus reference is made in the Commission's 
order, to some contract carrier permit which Prichard 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
formerly held. There is not one shred of evidence in the 
entire record with regard to what was contained in that 
contract carrier permit nor from which points it author-
ized Prichard to haul. There is nothing in the record 
to indicate the commodities which such permit authorized 
Prichard to haul, nor the contract or contracts under 
which the haul was n1ade. The only reference in the rec-
ord to such permit is made by Commissioner Hacking 
(R. 107) as follows: 
"As I think it (I) stated once before in an-
other case, my recollection is that Prichard held 
some acid hauling-contract acid hauling author-
ity. He prosecuted an application for specialized 
hauling as a common carrier, and the Commission 
in issuing-and the Commission issued some com-
mon carrier authority in that case, and when the 
common carrier authority was issued his special-
ized hauling, the contract authority held by Prich-
ard was cancelled, under the assumption that the 
common carrier authority issued included the con-
tract hauling, and it is my understanding that 
that has been the way the Commission has treated 
Prichard's authority since that time." 
Certainly this statement by a Commissioner, sitting 
in judgment on this case, as to what his recollection was 
as to some contract carrier authority which Prichard did 
not see fit to make a part of this record, cannot be con-
sidered evidence of any nature. 
The effect of the Commission's order is to grant 
Prichard authority to transport acid between any and all 
points in the State of Utah where the point of origin or 
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destination of the movement is in Uintah, Duchesne, Car-
bon, Emery, Wayne, Grand or SanJuan Counties, that is, 
the Commission has granted Prichard authority to haul 
acid throughout the entire area covered by his authority, 
which can be to any point within the state. This it does 
based upon a recollection of a pre-e·xisting contract car-
rier permit which has been cancelled for many years. 
Even if there were some evidence in the record regarding 
this contract carrier permit it certainly could not be the 
basis for extensive common carrier rights without an 
additional showing on proper application by Prichard. 
A contract carrier is defined in Section 54-6-1, U.C.A. 
1953 as follows: 
"'Contract motor carrier of property' means 
any person engaged in the transportation by 
motor vehicle of property for hire and not includ-
ed in the term common motor carrier of property 
as hereinbefore defined." 
The same section defines a common carrier as fol-
lows: 
" 'Common motor carrier of property' means 
any person who holds himself out to the public 
as willing to undertake for hire to transport by 
motor vehicle from place to place, the property 
of others who may choose to employ him." 
This court in the case of McCarthy et al. v. Public 
Service Commission, et al., 111 Utah 489, 184 P. 2d 220, 
defined a contract carrier as one who entered into in-
dividual contracts for each job and did not hold himself 
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out to the public generally. The court quoted with ap-
proval the definition of a contract carrier found in 
United States Code Annotated, Title 49, Section 303 (a) 
(15) as follows: 
"The term 'contract carrier by motor vehicle' 
means any person which, under individual con-
tracts or agreements, engages in the transporta-
tion ... by motor vehicle of passengers or prop-
erty ... for compensation." 
In the case of Lowe, et al. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, et al., 116 Utah 376, 210 P. 2d 558, this court again 
construed the term contract carrier and held that sepa-
rate corporations which entered into an agreement to 
form an association to transport their own separate 
goods were contract carriers. 
A contract carrier permit merely authorizes one to 
transport goods under a specific contract or agreement 
with a specific person, corporation or association. It is 
not and cannot be the basis for cmmnon carrier authority. 
The error of the Commission is more clearly pointed up 
when it is remembered that there is absolutely no evi-
dence in this record as to the commodity, contract, person, 
origin or destination supposedl~r contained in the al-
leged contract carrier permit formerly held by Prichard 
whirh is the basis of the Commission's order. 
The question now arises as to whether the language 
of the certificate of convenience and necessit~r held h;.' 
Prichard and hereinabove quoted can be fairly construed 
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to include the transportation of acid in bulk in tank truck 
vehicles. Prichard's counsel maintains that it does. Al-
though the Commission chooses to base the extension of 
Prichard's authority on the vague contract carrier rights 
before mentioned, Prichard's counsel contends that the 
existing certificate of convenience and necessity includes 
such authority as is shown frmn the following quotation 
from the record (R. 106). 
"MR. BOYLE: If the Commission please, I 
raise a question as to the right of Prichard Trans-
fer to appear in this case. 
"As I read their rights, I don't see that they 
include acid at all. I understand that they are mak-
ing one isolated haul, but I don't even know under 
what authority they make that haul-but I chal-
lenge their right to protest in this hearing and 
maintain that their rights do not cover the trans-
portation of acid. 
"MR. FINLINSON: Well, we submit it, Gen-
tlemen. We have been over this in previous hear-
ings. We submit that we are entitled under our 
authority to haul acid in the area we are permitted 
to haul, and we are here properly as protestants, 
and we submit it. 
"COM. HACKING: Well, what is your pof'i-
tion on that~ We did discuss this in another case, 
but it hasn't been discussed fully in this case, has 
it~ 
")JR. FINLINSON: Well, our position is 
that under our authority we can haul ar:irl, in that 
acid requires special equipment, and under our 
authority we can ha~tl it. 
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"You are familiar with our authoritY I think 
. ' ' and the broad language of the-with the approval 
of the Commission we have been hauling it since 
this authority was issued. (En1phasis added.) 
(R. 109, 110) : 
"MR. FINLINSON: Gentlemen, I call your 
attention to paragraph 2 of his authority: · 
'Commodities in connection with the trans-
porting of which is rendered a special service in 
preparing such commodities for shipment or set-
ting up after delivery or otherwise rendering a 
needed service not a part of the ordinary act of 
transporting and not now regularly furnished by 
other regular common carriers for the regular 
line rates.' 
Now, gentlemen, I submit that that covers the 
hauling of acid, and we have been hauling it, and 
whatever Mr. Pritchard might have said in any 
statement does not limit or restrict his authority, 
and the Commission has got to interpret it." 
The first paragraph of Prichard's authority gives 
him the right to transport: 
"Cmnmodities which by reason of their size, 
shape, weight, origin or destination require equip-
ment of (or) service of a character not regularly 
furnished by regular co nun on carriers at the regu-
lar line rates, which commodities shall be such 
as, but shall not be li1nited to the following: Gaso-
line tanks, Boilers, Pipes, and Tubing to be used 
in connection therewith; Cable, Bridges, or Struc-
tural Iron or Steel; Concrete Mixers, Culverts, 
Explosives, Grading and Road Equipment, Har-
vesters and Threshers; Locomotives, .Machinery 
and Drag-line outfits; Piling, Pipe, Pole Line Con-
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struction :Material, Telephone or Telegraph Poles; 
Rails; Smokestacks; and Heavy Timbers; Ma-
chinery, Materials, Supplies and equipment, inci-
dental to, or used in the construction, develop-
rnent, operation, and maintenance of facilities 
for the discovery, development, and production 
of natural gas and petroleum or minerals." 
We submit that under the familiar rule of ejusdum 
generis the most compelling argument that acid in bulk 
in tank truck vehicles is not included within this para-
graph consists of a mere reading thereof. Each and 
every one of the commodities mentioned in this paragraph 
is a large, bulky, heavy piece of solid equiprnent which 
requires special cranes, winches and rigs for the loading 
and unloading thereof. When Prichard's authority was 
originally granted it was the subject of an appeal to this 
court. See Uintah Freight Lines, et al. v. Pu-blic Serv~ce 
Commission, et al., ______ Utah ------, 223 P. 2d 408. The fol-
lo·wing quotations taken frmn this court's opinion in that 
case indicate the nature of Prichard's authority as con-
strued hy the court, Commission, counsel and Prichard 
himself: 
"Mr. Prichard, who resides in Price, adver-
tises and holds himself out in eastern Utah as a 
carrier of heavy commodities and equipment. He 
owns six trucks equipped with winches and six 
trailers ... Prichard has loaded arnd hauled com-
modities weighing as much as twenty-five tons on 
one of h~s trailers. 
'*' * * 
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"One Mike Gamber ... testified in behalf of 
Prichard's application. He testified that while it 
had been necessary to employ the services of a 
carrier of heavy commodities and equipment only 
once in the past twelve years, it would be a matter 
of convenience" to have Prichard's service. * * * 
"J. L. Larsen ... testified that (he) ... had 
the need occasionally for the services of a carrier 
of heavy commodit~es and that it would be a 
matter of convenience for the company to employ 
a person in Price * * * 
"George Jackson ... testified ... that he occa-
sionally has the need of the services of a carrier 
of hea,vy commodities and equipment in connection 
with his business and that it would be convenient 
for him to be able to employ Prichard ... " 
(Emphasis added.) 
Reference is made to the text of the entire opinion 
in this case whereby it is most evident that everyone 
concerned construed the authority which he had sought 
and obtained from the Commission, as being for the 
transportation of heavy equipment. This authority is 
the identical authority now held by Prichard and at this 
late date construed by the Cmnmission as including acid. 
There is little authority that can be cited to show 
the gross error in such a construction. \Yha t the Com-
mission has done is to enlarge the rights of Prichard 
based upon a showing 1nade b)~ petitioner. In the recent 
case of Peterson v. Public Ser·vice Commission, ______ Utah 
______ , 266 P. 2d -1-!J~, this court reversed an order of the 
Public Serviee Commission wl1icl1 attempted to eonstrue 
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the phrase between Salt Lake City and Provo as exclud-
ing transportation from Salt Lake City to Provo. In that 
case as in this one the Commission attempted to construe 
this authority in a collateral proceeding. An attempt was 
made to justify the Commission's action by citing the 
time-honored rule that the Supreme Court will not dis-
turb a finding of fact made by the Commission on com-
petent evidence. This court properly pointed out that 
such a construction of authority was not a finding of fact 
but a conclusion of law and stated that: 
''If it were permissible to go back of the lan-
guage and contradict its plain terms, intolerable 
confusion and uncertainty would exist with rega,rd 
to operating rights ... " (Emphasis added.) 
The court further stated: 
"Such attempted refinement does violence to 
the ordinary meaning of words." 
The Commission's action in the case at bar parallels 
its action in the Peterson case, supra. It is an attempt 
to vary the plain, unmnbiguous language of Prichard's 
certificate in a collateral proceeding without justification 
whatever. 
Paragraph :2 of Prichard's authority gives him the 
right to transport 
"Commodities in connection with the trans-
portation of which is rendered a special service in 
preparing such commodities for shiprnent or set-
ting up after delivery or otherwise rendering a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
needed service not a part of the ordinary act of 
transporting and not now regularly furnished hy 
other regular common carriers for the regular line 
rates." 
First of all, this paragraph must be read in connec-
tion with paragraph 1 as it relates to "heavy equipment.'' 
Certainly there is no special service necessary on behalf 
of the carrier in preparing acid for shipment or in setting 
it up after delivery, nor is there any other special ser-
vice to be rendered not a part of the ordinary act of 
transportation. Acid is loaded and unloaded by the use 
of a common ordinary air hose inserted in the tank con-
taining acid, the pressure from which forces the acid to 
flow out of the tank into the receptacle receiving the 
acid. This air hose is in all instances furnished by the 
shipper or the consignee (R. 176, 177). It is under no 
stretch of the imagination a special service rendered by 
the carrier. There is less service rendered in connection 
with loading or unloading acid than in the case of loading 
or unloading boxes of canned goods or any other ordinary 
commodity. There is absolutely no senTice rendered 
by the carrier in preparing the cmnmodity for shipment 
since this is done by Garfield Chemical Company. Prich-
ard's counsel atte1npted to elicit from witness Hatch 
testimony that acid equipment was special equipment 
by the following questions: (R. 120) 
"Q. Now, Mr. Hatch, referring to Exhibit 1, you 
have your first item that you stated was used 
in the transportation of acid is your item 
15-A, which is described as a Utility semi-
trailer; is that correct 1 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Now, describe that equipment, if you will, 
please~ 
A. Well, that is a 3500 gallon tank, steel pressure 
tank, with pressure valves on it for the pur-
pose of hauling acid, sitting on a Utility-in 
fact Utility Built it-on a Utility trailer. The 
utility part is the underneath part, the car-
riage part. 
Q. The wheels and the frame~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is specially constructed to haul the tank, 
is jt~- for the tank to sit on it1 
A. In this case it was." 
And again (R. 125): 
"Q. And that you had this tank built specially to 
haul acid 1 
A. Yes." 
And again ( R. 127) : 
"Q. So that you have to have 8pecialized equip-
ment to haul it? 
.. .\.. Yes." 
This attempt to have the witness Hatch state that 
acid equipment is specialized equipment actually has no 
bearing on the question. Prichard's authority is limited 
to transportation of commodities "in connection with the 
transporting of which is rendered a special service in 
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preparilng such commodities for shipment or sett,ing up 
after delivery or otherwise rendering a needed service.'-' 
His authority does not relate to special equip1nent and in 
any event does not relate to tank truck equipment. If it 
did his authority would allow him to transport gasolim·, 
fuel oil, crude oil, road oil, asphalt and all petroleum 
products transported in tank trucks, all of which require 
the same type of "special equip1nent" needed for the 
transportation of acid in bull{. We doubt if even Prichard 
would go as far as to make such a contention. 
On redirect examination Mr. Hatch clarified what he 
meant by "special equipment" (R.141). 
"Q. . .. I call your attention to the other equip-
ment that you show on your equipment list. 
What is that generally used for other than 
this acid equipment~ What do you haul in 
it~ 
A. We haul gasoline, diesel, light fuels, heavy 
fuels, road oil and asphalt. 
Q. And is that all tank truck equipment~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is it specially constructed to comply with 
the ICC regulations and the regulations of 
the Public Service Commission~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would you consider that equipment to be 
specialized equipment~ 
A. Yes." 
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Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Prichard's authority relate 
solely to campsite equipment, camp supplies, fixtures 
and accessories and supplies and equipment and appur-
tenances connected with the commodities described in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 whenever they are part of the same 
movement. There is just as 1nuch justification for con-
struing this language as including acid in bulk in tank 
truck vehicles as there is in construing paragraphs 1 and 
2 to include such commodity. 
We submit that Prichard's authority does not in-
clude acid and that the Commission's finding that it does 
·whether based upon a contract permit which was not 
in evidence or upon a tortured construction of the lan-
guage itself, is error. 
POINT II. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING PETITION-
ER'S APPLICATION AS TO ALL POINTS AND PLACES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH EXCEPT DAVIS AND WEBER 
COUNTIES. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Commission found 
that public convenience and necessity required the serv-
ices of truck transportation of acid in bulk in tank ve-
hicles in various portions of the state, it denied peti-
tioner's application for such authority except for trans-
portation frmn Salt Lake County to Davis and Weber 
Countie~. This action was based upon the erroneous con-
clusion that Prichard had authority to transport acid im 
nLriolls counties throughou.t the state. The error urged in 
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this respect is treated under Point No.1. However, in ad-
dition to this error we submit that apart frmn a con~true­
tion of Prichard's authority the Commission erred in 
denying the stated portions of petitioner's application for 
two reasons: 1. Even if Prichard's rights specifical1y 
included acid he does not rnaintain sufficient equipment 
to satisfy the acid transportation needs in this state. 
2. Since no rnotor carrier has authority to transport acid 
in the State of Utah except the petitioner public conven-
ience and necessity require the granting of petitioner's 
application in its entirety. 
Mr. Prichard testified on direct examination that he 
had only one tank which he could use in the transportation 
of acid (R. 257). 
"Q. (By Mr. Finlinson) All right, describe the 
equipment which you have that is used in your 
acid haul? 
A. Well, at the present time we have a Diamond-
T 1953 tractor with a 275 Cummings motor, 
and I have an acid tank built by the Lang 
Company. It is forty-two feet long-or forty 
feet long, forty-two inches in diameter. The 
capacity is around about 2700 gallons. 
Q. And is that hauled by this Diamond-T trac-
tor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, what else? 
A. That's all we use is that one tank and the 
tractor." 
I 
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On cross examination l\Tr. Prichard admitted that 
the tractor was used for heavy equipment hauling and 
was not limited to acid transportation (R. 265). 
"BY .J1R. BOYLE: 
Q. :Mr. Prichard, this money that you have got 
invested in acid equipment is solely the money 
you have in your tank; is that right1 
A. Storage tank and air compressor. 
Q. You use your tractor for other hauls as well, 
do you not1 
A. Oh, yes." 
rrhe storage tank and compressor which Mr. Prichard 
refers to is the one located at the railhead at Thompson. 
It is a stationary tank and cannot be used for transporta-
tion. The testimony in this case shows that there will be 
need in the near future for in excess of 10 loads of acid 
per day to various parts of the state as divergent as San 
.Juan and Weber Counties. Even if Prichard's authority 
included acid, which it does not, it was error for the Com-
mission to deny petitioner'~ application on the ground 
that Prichard had aeid authorit~~. rrhis court has held, 
in accordance with the general rule and decisions of other 
state and federal courts, that the Commission should look 
to future requirements as well as present ones. :--;ee the 
ease of Jf1tlcahy, et al. v. Public SerPice Commission, et 
aL, 101 Utah 2-t-5, 117 P. 2d 298. In that case the court 
stated: 
"The statute should be so construed and ap-
plied as to encourage rather than retard mechani-
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cal and other improvements in appliances and in 
the quality of the service rendered the public .... 
and should look to the future as well as the pres-
ent, providing not only for present urgent needs, 
but such as may reasonably be anticizmted from 
the probable growth of the population, industry, 
and community development." (Emphasis added.) 
Since there is no motor carrier authorized to trans-
port acid in the state except petitioner, and inasmuch as 
the evidence clearly shows that truck transportation per-
forms a different service from rail transportation, and is 
a necessary adjunct to rail transportation, and inasmuch 
as a large portion of the state is without rail service of 
any kind, we submit that it was error for the Commission 
to deny petitioner's application for statewide authority. 
The evidence shows that spent acid is available at several 
points throughout the state and that this acid is used 
in various industries (R. 250, 251) and that new indus-
tries requiring the use of acid are coming into being (R. 
251). It is not in the public interest to restrict the rights 
of petitioner to specific counties or points particularly 
where there is no such service available throughout the 
state. To require a carrier to make a new application for 
each specific point to which service is needed from time 
to time, when there are no other authorized carriers in 
the state with authority to haul the commodity is an un-
due burden on the earrier and an abuse of discretion. 
There should be sufficient flexibility to allow transporta-
tion to new points which will in turn encourage the indus-
J 
• OJ 
I 
I 
I .~l 
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trial growth of the state. \Ve submit that petitioner's 
application should have been granted in its entirety and 
that Commission's denial of portions thereof was error. 
CONCLUSION 
Prichard has no authority to transport acid, and the 
Commission's denial of petitioner's application on the 
ground that he does have, after a finding that public 
convenience and necessity require the transportation of 
acid h:v motor vehicle, is clearly error. The Commission 
enlarged Prichard's rights in an application and on a 
showing made by petitioner. Prichard's authority was 
enlarged on one of two theories: 
1. That some vague previously canceled contract 
permit which was not in evidence and which must neces-
sarily have been for a specific unnamt>d product, under 
a specific unnamed contract, for a specific unnamed 
shipper, could be the basis for the enlargement of Prich-
ard's authority as a common carrier for any acid haul 
which originated or terminated in any one of the seven 
counties nained in Prichard's authority. Thus the Com-
mission has given Prichard authority to transport acid 
to or frmn a,ny point within the state, providing the haul 
originates or terminates within one of the named coun-
ties. At the same time, after giving such an unwarranted 
grant of authority to Prichard, the Commission has re-
sb·icted petitioner's application to specific counties even 
though its evidence admittedly shows a need for such 
transportation over a rnuch broader area. 
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2. The only other possible ground for the Commis-
sion's action is a construction of Prichard's present au-
thority to include acid. A mere reading of such authority 
is conclusive proof that it does not. The Commission rec-
ognized this fact and attempted to circun1vent it by add-
ing a footnote in its order to the effect that it may bP 
necessary to issue a new order to Prichard; all of tlti ~ 
action on the Commission's part being done pursuant to 
petitioner's application and evidence. That such action 
is arbitrary and capricious and clearly error i~, we sub-
mit, too clear for argument. 
The evidence shows that there is a need for peti-
tioner's services throughout the state, that no other 
motor carrier has authority to transport acid, that acid 
is used in various industries and the transportation there-
of may originate or terminate at various points. The 
Commission erred in failing to grant petitioner's applica-
tion in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
MARK K. BOYLE 
Attorneys for Petit~oner 
, 
I 
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